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Ethical Violations Resulting from Excessive
Workloads in Legal Aid Offices: Who
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Preventing Them?
INTRODUCTION
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code")
encourages lawyers to make legal services available to all, includ-
ing those who are unable to pay all or part of a reasonable fee.'
Legal aid organizations2 and related programs have developed be-
cause the efforts of individual lawyers proved insufficient to meet
the legal needs of the poor.3 Since the number of indigents in need
of assistance greatly exceeds the available supply of legal services
for the poor, the problem of fairly allocating scarce legal resources
1. "[P]ersons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to
obtain necessary legal services, and lawyers should support and participate in ethical ac-
tivities designed to achieve that objective." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY ("MODEL CODE") EC 2-16 (1981).
If there is any fundamental proposition of government on which all would
agree, it is that one of the highest goals of society must be to achieve and main-
tain equality before the law. Yet this ideal remains an empty form of words
unless the legal profession is ready to provide adequate representation for those
unable to pay the usual fees.
Professional Representation: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216
(1958), quoted in MODEL CODE EC 2-16 n. 25. Ethical Considerations ("EC's") are
provisions of the Model Code which state goals lawyers should strive to attain. Discipli-
nary Rules ("DR's") state the minimum level of conduct a lawyer must maintain to avoid
disciplinary action. MODEL CODE Preamble.
"Men have a need for more than a system of law; they have a need for a system of law
which functions, and that means they have need for lawyers." Cheatham, The Lawyer's
Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 405 (1953), quoted in MODEL CODE
EC 2-1 n.1.
2. For purposes of this note, the term "legal aid organization" will include all types of
organizations providing civil legal assistance for the poor, including traditional legal aid
societies, government-funded legal services offices, and judicare plans. See infra notes 7-8
for a discussion of the development of these various types of legal aid organizations.
Although this note focuses on civil legal assistance, the caseload problems of public
defenders are used for purposes of comparison and illustration because public defenders
generally carry extremely large caseloads. Further, many of the cases and articles rele-
vant to the caseload problem focus on public defenders.
3. MODEL CODE EC 2-25.
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constantly faces legal aid attorneys.4 One method of attempting to
fulfill the goal of making legal services available to all is to provide
minimal assistance to large numbers of clients. Organizations
which follow this approach may violate certain provisions of the
Model Code which state that a lawyer owes his client competent
representation, undivided loyalty and zealous advocacy.'
Given the possibility of such ethical violations, the question
arises of whether the legal aid organization or the individual staff
attorney should bear the primary responsibility for preventing
them.6 In order to examine this question, this note first discusses
the problems excessive caseloads cause for legal aid clients and at-
torneys. A review of past solutions to the caseload problem will
follow. The note then presents two differing approaches to the is-
sue of whether the legal aid organization or the individual staff
attorney bears the responsibility for limiting caseload to prevent
4. In 1975, there were approximately 11.2 lawyers for every 10,000 persons above the
federal poverty line. Even with over $100 million in federal subsidies there was less than
one lawyer for every 10,000 people below the poverty line. Only about 15% of the legal
problems of the poorest segments of the population receive any kind of legal attention. L.
GOODMAN & M. WALTERS, THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM: RESOURCE DISTRIBU-
TION AND THE Low INCOME POPULATION 11-59 (1975), quoted in Bellow & Kettleson,
From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58
B.U. L. REV. 337, 342 n.26 (1978).
5. Not surprisingly, public interest lawyers feel considerable tension between profes-
sional obligations to clients and the Code's aspirations concerning the availability of legal
services and the improvement of the legal system. In attempting to accommodate these
tensions, they may risk subordinating client interests to their own conceptions of the
public or general good. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4, at 343.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates the pressures created by high wor-
kloads in legal aid offices:
Lawyers in the DEF Legal Services [a hypothetical organization] office carry
seventy-five cases each. Working fifty to sixty hours per week, they handle the
problems these cases raise in ways that comply - though just barely - with
Canons 6 and 7. [Canons are provisions of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility which express in general terms the standards of professional con-
duct for lawyers. MODEL CODE Preamble.] Although the office makes only
minimal efforts to publicize the availability of legal services and no effort to
inform potential clients of legal rights and remedies of which they might be
unaware, the office regularly receives large numbers of requests for assistance.
Faced with a choice of reducing service to each client in order to increase vol-
ume, or turning clients away to maintain present case and service levels, the
office decides to try to help in some way anyone who asks for and is otherwise
eligible for assistance. Because there are so many people in need, and no one
can say that any one group "deserves" service more than another, most of the
staff and board think this is preferable to turning people away, ever [sic] if the
quality of service suffers.
Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4, at 354.
6. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent
Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 530.
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ethical violations. The note concludes that legal aid organizations
should bear the primary responsibility for limiting caseload to en-
sure competent representation. Finally, the note proposes the
adoption of an ethical standard concerning caseload in legal aid
organizations.
BACKGROUND
The Caseload Problem
The problem of excessive caseloads in legal aid offices has per-
sisted over several decades7 and exists in all types of legal aid orga-
nizations.8 Excessive caseloads could result in violations of certain
7. The publication in 1919 of Reginald Heber Smith's landmark study of legal aid in
the United States, Justice and the Poor, gave impetus to the growth of legal aid societies,
financed by private contributions. These societies already existed in most major cities.
Between 1920 and 1960, however, these societies employed a very small number of attor-
neys (only 292 in the entire country in 1959) and were overburdened by heavy caseloads.
J. KATZ, POOR PEOPLES' LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 65 (1982); Stashower, A Brief His-
tory of Legal Services: 10 on the Richter Scale, 38 NLADA BRIEFCASE 18 (1981).
8. Public defender offices are often nearly overwhelmed by heavy workloads. See,
e.g., Ligda, Work Overload and Defender Burnout, 35 NLADA BRIEFCASE 5 (1977).
In addition, government-funded legal services offices have had high caseloads from
their inception. In a seminal article, Jean and Edgar Cahn proposed the establishment of
neighborhood law offices associated with universities as a method of increasing the availa-
bility of legal services for the poor. Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Per-
spective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1334-52 (1964). In 1965, the Office of Economic
Opportunity established government-funded but locally controlled neighborhood legal
services programs. Stashower, supra note 7, at 19. Although these programs employed
1600 attorneys by 1969, they too were soon overburdened by a heavy caseload. Clark,
Legal Services Programs - The Caseload Problem, or How to Avoid Becoming the New
Welfare Department, 47 J. URB. L. 797 (1970). The commentator concluded that the
most serious legal problem of the poor was the excessive caseloads of legal services pro-
grams and that resolving the caseload problem should be "the highest priority of legal
service programs." Id. at 798; see also Bellow, Reflections on Case-Load Limitation, 27
NLADA BRIEFCASE 195 (1969) (recommending the adoption of caseload limitation
guidelines by legal aid offices); Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective
Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927, 928 (1966) (reviewing the progress of legal serv-
ices programs since their inception); Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for
the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URB. L. 217 (1969) (stating it is impossi-
ble for civil legal assistance programs to serve all or even a majority of the poor). But see
Getzels, Legal Aid Cases Should Not Be Limited, 27 NLADA BRIEFCASE 203 (1969)
(caseload problem should be solved by expanding legal services for the poor, rather than
by limiting caseload).
Private bar involvement in providing legal services for the poor has not solved the
caseload problem. Under judicare plans, private attorneys who choose to participate are
paid by the plan to provide legal services to eligible poor persons. Amicus Curiae Brief
for the Legal Services Corporation in Support of the Defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment at 1, Parsley v. West Virginia Legal Services Plan, Inc., No. 76-0181 (S.D.W.
Va. filed March 11, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief]. The West Virginia
judicare plan instituted a system of priorities in order to control its heavy caseload. Id. at
8-9; see also S.J. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR
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disciplinary rules (DR's), which are the Model Code provisions
stating the minimum level of conduct a lawyer must maintain to
avoid disciplinary action.9 First, DR 5-105(A) requires a lawyer to
decline proffered employment which might adversely affect his in-
dependent judgment on behalf of existing clients. 10 Second, DR 6-
101 (A)(2) requires adequate preparation. " Third, DR 6-101 (A)(3)
prohibits an attorney's neglect of legal matters entrusted to him. 12
An attorney with an excessively large caseload may find it impossi-
ble to prepare adequately for pressing matters without neglecting
work for other clients. In addition, a lawyer with a very large
workload may fail to fulfill his duty to represent each individual
client zealously within the bounds of the law, thus violating DR 7-
101.13
Courts have recognized the problems caused by the heavy
workloads of legal aid attorneys, court-appointed private attor-
neys, and public defenders. 4 Two courts have observed that exces-
sive caseloads could result in violations of ethical standards
requiring adequate preparation and prohibiting neglect. In an ac-
tion concerning ethical violations committed by a private attorney
appointed by the court to represent criminal defendants in two
criminal appeals, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that an attorney's heavy caseload, combined with marital and
health difficulties, did not excuse neglect of matters entrusted to
him. ' 5 In another action, the New York Superior Court, Appellate
Term, reversed a lower court's appointment of a federally funded
legal services project to represent an indigent defendant in a land-
lord-tenant case. The court held that the order appointing the pro-
PEOPLE (1974) (advocates replacing staff attorney legal services programs with judicare
programs); Dooley, Legal Services for the Poor.: The Debate Between Staffed Programs
and Judicare, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 193 (1983) (discusses the advantages and disad-
vantages of staff attorney and judicare programs).
9. MODEL CODE Preamble.
10. MODEL CODE DR 5-105(A).
11. MODEL CODE DR 6-101(A)(2).
12. MODEL CODE DR 6-10l(A)(3).
13. "A lawyer shall not intentionally ... [flail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means." MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(l).
14. See, e.g., Flores v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. App. 3d 681, 106
Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973). The California Court of Appeal held that an unemployment com-
pensation claimant whose appeal was not mailed until after the deadline because of the
large caseload and the secretarial backlog in a legal aid office was entitled to an extension
of the appeal deadline. Id. at 685, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 546; see infra notes 15-16 amd
accompanying text.
15. In re Whitlock, 441 A.2d 989, 990-91 (D.C. 1982); see also In re Amundson, 297
N.W.2d 433, 443 (N.D. 1980) (a heavy workload does not excuse failure to attend to
matters entrusted to attorney's care).
[Vol. 16
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ject to represent the tenant would compel project attorneys to
violate canons of legal ethics which require adequate preparation
and promptness because of their already excessive caseloads.1 6 In
addition to causing ethical violations, excessive caseloads engender
problems for poor persons in need of legal services.
Adverse Effects of Excessive Caseloads on Legal Aid Clients
Poor clients, unlike clients who can afford private attorneys,
generally have only two alternatives: to obtain assistance from
legal aid offices or to forego legal representation. 7 Accordingly,
many members of the legal profession believe that the best ap-
proach is to give some, even if inadequate, legal services to all indi-
gents.18 Such an approach, however, violates certain provisions of
16. Tobak v. Mojica, No. 66859-72 (N.Y. App. Term. May 11, 1973), abstracted in 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167 (1973).
One commentator discussed the effects on clients of an attempt by a hypothetical legal
aid attorney to serve 20 clients in one day:
But each of that twenty would be receiving diluted benefits, since the postulate
of the attorney-day unit was that it was a measure of the quantity of service
necessary to provide adequate, professional legal services. And although the
twenty poor would each probably come away with the satisfaction that he and
received legal services, only for those whose legal problems had been in fact
imaginary or had required only the most minimal part of an attorney-day for
complete resolution would this satisfaction be real. Most of the twenty would
obtain only the illusion of legal help, rather than the actuality of adequate, effec-
tive professional legal services. Adequate, professional legal services are divisible
only to the point where they are no longer adequate, professional legal services.
Silver, supra note 8, at 223 (emphasis in original).
17. "Those refused aid [by government-funded legal services offices] will not be
helped elsewhere - by referral to an inoperative volunteer panel or a grossly over-
worked legal aid society. Any such resources have already been calculated, have already
been counted in the assessment of available legal resources." Silver, supra note 8, at 224.
The following quotation illustrates the legal problems which remain unsolved when
poor people are denied legal services:
A family of four with an income under $3,000 per year is more likely than
not to have several debts, far in excess of the family's ability to pay, for grossly
overpriced items purchased on credit, in some cases as the result of shady sell-
ing practices or with illegal hidden charges. For this there are legal remedies.
If the family lives in private rental housing, or even in a city or state housing
development, their housing is more probably than not substandard and not in
compliance with relevant health and building codes. For this there are legal
remedies. If they are receiving welfare, they probably have not been told about
"special needs" allocations which they are entitled to receive or vocational
training which may be available, and their budget may well have been figured
incorrectly. For these problems there are legal remedies. Children may attend
racially segregated schools which are likely to be substantially inferior to those
attended by middle-class children in the same community. For this, too, there
are legal remedies.
Id. at 219.
18. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4, at 354-55. But see also ABA Comm. on
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the Model Code, which require zealous advocacy and adequate
preparation and prohibit neglect.19
On the other hand, organizations may decide to focus their ef-
forts on a particular problem, such as housing, and reject clients
with other types of problems.2" Thus, certain clients will be denied
legal assistance because their problems do not fall into areas with
which the legal aid organization has chosen to deal. Although
many members of the bar have expressed serious ethical reserva-
tions about this method of controlling caseload, the Model Code
permits such selectivity.2'
Adverse Effects of Excessive Workload on Legal Aid Attorneys
Excessive workloads also have adverse effects on legal aid attor-
neys. Overloading legal aid attorneys may cause them to treat all
cases alike, thus failing to recognize unusual legal issues.22 On the
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359 at 1 (1976) (rejects argument
that fairness and reason are best served by giving all poor persons some legal services,
even if the services are inadequate).
19. Discussing a hypothetical situation in which a legal services program, DEF Legal
Services, attempts to provide minimal legal services to as many clients as possible, com-
mentators concluded:
Despite our sympathy with this desire to help those without service, nothing in
the Code sanctions such conduct. In fact, it would be hard to find a set of
practices so flatly in violation of its provisions. The high volume, minimal ser-
vice mode of practice towards which the DEF program seems to be moving is
directly prohibited or circumscribed by specific provisions of the Code.
Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4, at 355-56. See supra note 5 for a description of DEF
Legal Services' manner of handling its excessive caseload.
Another commentator said:
Little attention has been given to the question of whether the criminal defense
attorney has an ethical obligation to achieve a minimum level of competence
and zealous advocacy.
There is some indication that were this question to be addressed, most of the
bar would conclude that there is no ethical problem presented by defenders
trying to serve as many people as possible. Yet, there is little or no support for
this position in the applicable ethical guidelines.
Mounts, supra note 6, at 494-95; see supra note 5.
20. Bellow and Kettleson, supra note 6, at 343-53.
21. It is widely believed that there is some professional obligation that requires
that clients be served on a first come, first serve basis, Such views find no sup-
port in the formal ethics of the profession.
Id. at 345.
22. DRAFT STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR
at 3.2 (National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n Discussion Draft 1984) ("NLADA STAN-
DARDS").
A pamphlet from the NLADA contains the following statement concerning these
standards:
NLADA coordinated the development of substantive "Standards for Providers
of Civil Legal Services to the Poor." This document is a statement of the orga-
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other hand, they may be tempted to narrowly define legal issues in
order to keep time commitments to a minimum.23 They may also
cut off a client interview as soon as they discover an easily resolved
legal problem, ignoring possible related issues.24 Moreover, attor-
neys who are consistently unable to do their best because of exces-
sive workloads may lose confidence in their own effectiveness.2"
Courts have recognized the difficulties faced by public defenders,
who often handle extremely large caseloads. In 1970, a public de-
fender who had been discharged after he complained about, inter
alia, his excessive caseload, brought a wrongful discharge action
against the New York Legal Aid Society. 26 A federal court dis-
missed the action because the attorney failed to demonstrate that
nizational and functional components for high-quality civil representation for
poor persons. It is currently being reviewed by the American Bar Association
(ABA), the National Bar Association (NBA), National Conference of Black
Lawyers (NCBL), and the Hispanic Bar Association (HBA), for potential en-
dorsement. The Standards are a foundation for the Management Project's [an-
other NLADA project whose goal is the improvement of the management of
civil legal services programs] work in assisting civil programs' maintenance of
high quality representation.
The NLADA brochure also contains the following statement concerning the history,
membership, and purpose of the NLADA:
In 1911, 15 legal aid programs founded a national organization to ensure that
America did not ration justice.
Since then, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) has
fought for the right of poor persons in America to equal justice and their right
to legal help in seeking that justice. NLADA advocates these rights before the
courts, the public, the private bar, Congress and other governmental bodies.
Currently, NLADA represents more than 2,300 civil legal aid and public
defender offices nationwide. Within these programs, over 25,000 professionals
benefit from NLADA membership. In addition, NLADA's membership in-
cludes private attorneys, legal services attorneys, bar associations, judges, pri-
vate law firms, clients, law students, paralegals, social workers, defense
investigators, and members of the general public who support our goals...
The Association's goal is to ensure that poor persons receive high quality
legal assistance when needed . ...
NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, THOU SHALT NOT RATION JUSTICE.
23. "To keep time commitments to a minimum, they [legal service advocates] may be
tempted to define narrowly both the legal issues in new cases and the potential relief to be
sought." NLADA STANDARDS at 3.7.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 312 F. Stipp. 1105 (1970), affid, 445 F.2d 1150 (2d
Cir. 1971). In 1968, the year Lefcourt complained about his workload, the Annual Re-
port of the Legal Aid Society of New York indicated that public defenders in the Soci-
ety's Criminal Division handled 1006 cases per attorney. Mounts, supra note 5, at 523
n.224. Attorneys at the New York Legal Aid Society later formed a union and thus had
some job protection. Nevertheless, the caseload problems continued after unionization
and were a contributing cause to a bitter and devastating strike. See infra notes 29-31
and accompanying text.
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the society had violated his first amendment rights. However, the
court noted that the case illustrated the agonizing difficulties faced
by public defenders "in the appallingly overcrowded metropolitan
courts of the country. 27
In 1982, another public defender in New York was terminated
after he complained to his superiors about his excessive caseload.28
In the same year, the Legal Aid Society of New York experienced
a devastating ten-week strike in which workload was a major issue,
which left a residue of bitterness and animosity. 29 The new chair-
man of the board of the Legal Aid Society, who had been elected
less than a month after the end of the strike, noted that the strike
was not about money but self-respect and recognition.30 Further,
he stated that caseload and working conditions of staff attorneys
had to be changed.3' In attempting to prevent problems such as
those experienced by the New York Legal Aid Society, legal aid
organizations have tried to reduce their caseloads by several
methods.32
Attempted Solutions to the Caseload Problems
One method is refusing to take certain types of cases, such as
divorces.33 In one action, an appellate court found that a lower
court's appointment to a divorce case of a legal assistance corpora-
27. Lefcourt, 312 F. Supp. at 1106.
28. The termination was submitted to arbitration. In re Weldon Brewer, No. 1330-
1379-82 [pending before the American Arbitration Ass'n]. The New York Times carried
the following story concerning Mr. Brewer's termination:
An arbitrator began taking testimony yesterday to determine whether the Legal
Aid Society acted properly when it discharged a senior lawyer last October.
The ouster of the lawyer, Weldon Brewer, was one of the factors that triggered
a 10-week strike by 550 of the society's lawyers. The lawyers' union, the Asso-
ciation of Legal Aid Attorneys, said Mr. Brewer was dismissed because of his
complaints about unmanageable workloads. But the executive director of the
society, Archibald R. Murray, said Mr. Brewer had been discharged because he
had mishandled two cases. Mr. Brewer had been employed by the society for
10 years.
Legal Aid Lawyer Subject of Hearing, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at B3, col. 1.
29. See Fox, Healing Strike Wounds Aim of New Legal Aid Chairman, 189 N.Y. L.J.
1 (1983).
The Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago also experienced a strike in the spring of
1984. 130 Chi. Daily L. Bull., April 13, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
30. Fox, supra note 29, at 2.
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Neighborhood Legal Serv. Ass'n, 523 F. Supp. 376, 377-78
(W.D. Pa. 1981). In this case, taxpayers alleged that the legal services organization's
recently adopted policy not to accept divorce cases and related matters was an ultra vires
act. Id. at 377. The district court dismissed this claim because plaintiffs were barred
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tion which had adopted a policy of refusing divorce cases in order
to reduce its heavy workload was an improvident exercise of dis-
cretion.34 Legal aid offices have also adopted priority systems for
case acceptance35 and instituted weekly meetings at which attor-
neys can discuss client interviews and decide which cases to
accept.36
In addition to the caseload control efforts employed by legal aid
offices themselves, one court attempted to solve the caseload prob-
lem in a public defender office by setting a numerical caseload limi-
tation. 37  A civil rights action was brought before the court on
behalf of incarcerated criminal defendants alleging that detainees
were denied effective assistance of counsel because of the excessive
caseload of the Legal Aid Society.38 In this action, the district
court issued an injunction limiting the average caseload of each
public defender to forty felony indictments. 39 The court of appeals
under applicable state law from bringing such an action because they were not sharehold-
ers of the organization. Id. at 378.
34. Cerami v. Cerami, 44 A.D. 2d 890, 355 N.Y.S.2d (1974); see also Amicus Curiae
Brief, supra note 8, at 10 (West Virginia judicare plan decided not to accept uncontested
divorce cases in which child custody was not an issue).
35. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 8, at 8-10 (West Virginia judicare plan
instituted a system of priorities in order to control its caseload.)
36. See, e.g., Williamson, Group Case Acceptance Meetings, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 1075-81 (1981) (discusses case acceptance meetings).
37. Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd and vacated, 481 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1973). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
district court had no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Legal Aid Society
was not acting under color of state law. On remand, the district court held that incarcer-
ation for a long period of time without trial violates prisoners' sixth amendment rights.
371 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd and vacated, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.
1974) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974). The Second Circuit then held that the sixth
amendment does not require states to bring criminal defendants to trial within a specific
time period.
38. See supra note 37. During the trial, the Deputy Director of Operations of the
Legal Aid Society testified that "the system isn't working." 392 F. Supp. at 835. The
average caseload of Legal Aid attorneys assigned to the Kings County Supreme Court in
March 1973 was 94. A private attorney testified that he would not try to handle more
than 25 to 35 cases. Id. at 836. A report by the then Chairman of the Board of Correc-
tions of the City of New York, dated March 25, 1973, stated that:
As long as their caseloads remain at the present staggering levels, it is impos-
sible for Legal Aid attorneys to form productive relationships with their clients,
thoroughly investigate and prepare their cases, counsel their clients, and take an
active role in the sentencing process. In short, an attorney with an active
caseload of 100 felony cases cannot provide effective representation to his
clients.
392 F. Supp. at 843.
39. The court is convinced, and finds, that an average caseload of 40 felony in-
dictments pending in a trial Part [section of the criminal courts] strains the
utmost capacity of a Legal Aid attorney under existing conditions, that the
present average caseload is substantially in excess of that number, and that ac-
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reversed this decision on procedural grounds.4
One commentator has criticized the setting of such strict numer-
ical caseload limitation standards for legal aid organizations.4" He
contended that an overly rigorous application of written policies
limiting caseload could be counterproductive to the achievement of
the organization's purposes.42 A strict numerical limit could result
in the refusal of service to clients because an attorney's caseload
has reached the limit, even though the attorney could serve these
clients adequately since most of his other cases require relatively
little time and effort.43 In other words, this result would defeat the
organization's purpose of providing legal services to as many poor
persons as possible." On the other hand, an organization's insis-
tence that a staff attorney carry the full caseload permitted could
result in poor quality service, if most of his cases were difficult and
time-consuming.45
Congress has also recognized the possibility of ethical violations
resulting from excessive caseloads. In enacting the Legal Services
Corporation Act,46 Congress tried to prevent such ethical viola-
tions by setting professional standards for government-funded legal
services offices.4 7 This legislation was designed to ensure full free-
dom for staff attorneys to protect the best interests of their clients
in keeping with ethical standards. 4  The Act established a non-
ceptance of any additional felony indictments by Legal Aid would prevent it
from affording its existing clients their constitutional rights to counsel.
392 F. Supp. at 849.
40. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court had no jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Legal Aid Society was not acting under color of state
law. 481 F.2d at 622.
41. Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291 (1980). Car-
rington also stated: "[S]upervision in high-volume law offices is itself a problem. . . [I]t
is virtually unavoidable to leave substantial discretion with the individual staff attorneys
in deciding how best to apply their own time." Id. at 1303-04.
42. Id. at 1304.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1984).
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 247, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3872, 3873-74.
48. Id.
The legislators cited a resolution overwhelmingly passed by the ABA House of Dele-
gates in 1973, which stated:
The United States government should increase the level of funding of Legal
Services Programs to enable them to provide adequate legal services to eligible
clients and to prevent a serious deterioration of the quality and quantity of ser-
vice because of increased expense and mounting caseloads. Government at all
levels and lawyers from both the public and private sectors should take every
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profit corporation chartered by Congress to ensure the mainte-
nance of the highest quality professional standards.49
Ethical Standards Concerning Workload
In addition to this standard set by Congress, the ABA and simi-
lar organizations have promulgated ethical guidelines concerning
workload. One such set of standards, the Model Code, does not
specifically address the workload question, although several of its
provisions indirectly relate to this issue. 5° The commentary to one
of the provisions of another set of ethical standards, the proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), states that
an attorney's workload should be controlled so that the attorney
can handle each matter adequately.5'
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide that public de-
fender organizations should not accept excessive workloads which
interfere with quality representation or lead to ethical violations.52
Further, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association's
("NLADA") draft of proposed standards for providers of legal
assistance to the poor53 includes a caseload limitation provision.54
Despite these various guidelines, the problems caused by heavy
step necessary to insure that legal services lawyers remain independent from
political pressures in the cause of representing clients. The Congress of the
United States should enact a legal services corporation of a design consistent
with the foregoing principles and the need to maintain full and adequate legal
services for the poor.
Id.
In the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the Legal Services Corporation
Act, the House Judiciary Committee stated: "The Committee recognizes that no legal
services program has sufficient resources to meet all the legal needs of the financially
eligible population in the area it serves." H.R. Rep. No. 310, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 11-12,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4503, 4512-13.
The committee also recognized "that Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits lawyers from undertaking more cases than they can
handle in a professional manner. Every program has found it necessary to control its
caseload." Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(1) (1974).
50. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 6-101(A)(2), (3), which provides:
"(A) A lawyer shall not: .... (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation ade-
quate in the circumstances[;] (3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." See supra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
51. "A Lawyer's workload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled
adequately." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ("MODEL RULES") Rule 1.3
comment 1 (1983).
52. "Neither defender organizations nor assigned counsel should accept workloads
that, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality representa-
tion or lead to the breach of professional obligations." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 5-4.3 (1980) ("CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS").
53. "The [NLADA] Standards are designed to guide organizations providing civil
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
workloads still exist because of the great number of poor persons in
need of legal services. Furthermore, these guidelines fail to resolve
the issue of whether the legal aid organization or the individual
attorney is responsible for limiting caseload to prevent ethical
violations.
DISCUSSION
Relative Responsibility
The Model Code and the Model Rules do not directly address
the question of responsibility for limiting caseload. 5 DR 1-
102(A)(2) does state, however, that a lawyer may not circumvent
disciplinary rules through the actions of another. 6 Rule 5.1(b) of
the Model Rules provides that a supervising lawyer should make
reasonable efforts to ensure that subordinates conform to the
Model Rules.57 Rule 5.2(a) of the Model Rules states that a lawyer
legal assistance to the poor. . . .They are intentionally aspirational." NLADA STAN-
DARDS Introduction.
54. NLADA STANDARDS at 3-6.
55. See Mounts, supra note 6, at 530.
56. MODEL CODE DR I-102(A)(2); see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 95 (1933) (finding that a municipal attorney was responsible for
the acts of police officers under his supervision); MODEL CODE DR 7-107(J) (a lawyer
should exercise reasonable care to prevent subordinates from making extra-judicial state-
ments prohibited by the Model Code).
57. MODEL RULES Rule 5. l(b). Failure to limit caseload could result in violations of.
the following Model Rules: Rule 1.1, which states that "[a] lawyer shall provide compe-
tent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation," and
Rule 1.3, which states that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." MODEL RULES Rules 1.1, 1.3. Courts have held that "[a]
lawyer is not liable in a disciplinary proceeding for the misconduct of a partner, associate
or employee on the basis of imputed liability. However, a lawyer is chargeable with viola-
tions resulting from the conduct of a partner, associate or employee if the lawyer autho-
rizes it or has knowledge of the misconduct and continues to participate in transactions
or profits that stem from it." MODEL RULES Rule 5.1 legal background of rule. See, e.g.,
In re Corace, 390 Mich. 419, 213 N.W.2d 124 (1973) (a lawyer is not subject to discipline
for the wrongful acts of an employee, where there is no evidence that the lawyer should
have been aware of the wrongful acts); State v. Breslin, 169 P. 897 (Okla. 1917) (attorney
not subject to disbarment or suspension because of a partner's wrongful retention of a
client's funds, where attorney had no connection with partner's wrongful act); In re
Brown, 389 11. 561, 59 N.E.2d 855 (1945) (attorney who knew of senior partner's bribes
to public officials suspended from the practice of law for six months, even though attor-
ney did not participate in the bribery scheme); In re Fata, 22 A.D.2d 116, 254 N.Y.S.2d
289 (1964) (attorney had duty to know what was taking place in his law firm, and was
therefore responsible for partner's acts, even though he denied knowledge of them); see
also People v. Betts, 26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091 (1899) (partner's knowledge that firm
wrongly retained client's funds sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, regardless of
which partner actually retained the funds); In re Rosenberg, 413 Ill. 567, 110 N.E.2d 186
(1953) (holding that partner's knowledge of misappropriation of trust funds was sufficient
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is bound by those rules even though he acts at the direction of
another attorney.58 In addition, Rule 5.2(b) states that a
subordinate lawyer does not violate the Model Rules if he acts in
accordance with a supervisor's reasonable resolution of an arguable
ethical question.59
The comment to Rule 5.2(b) states that a supervisor may ordina-
rily make professional judgments concerning ethical duties to en-
sure that the firm or association takes a consistent position.1° If
there is only one reasonable answer to an ethical question, the duty
of both the supervisor and subordinate is clear and both are equally
responsible for fulfilling it.6" However, if the issue is reasonably
arguable, the authority to resolve the question ordinarily resides in
the supervisor and the subordinate may follow the supervisor's gui-
dance.6 2 In addition to the indirect guidance provided by the
Model Code and the Model Rules, a commentator and the
NLADA have suggested two different approaches.
Placing the Responsibility on the Individual Attorney
One commentator, writing in the context of public defender pro-
grams, has proposed revising Model Rule 5.2(b) specifically to
place the responsibility for resolving ethical questions on the indi-
vidual attorney.63 Criticizing the Model Rule as it is presently
to warrant disciplinary action, in the absence of any attempt to prevent or correct the
misconduct); In re Kiley, 22 A.D.2d 527, 256 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1965) (partner subject to
disciplinary action because of negligence in failing to uncover misconduct, although he
was not knowingly guilty); In re Weitz, 11 A.D.2d 76, 202 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1960) (attorney
subject to discipline for misconduct of partner because the evidence showed a pattern of
misconduct on the part of both partners).
58. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(a).
"A subordinate lawyer is liable for misconduct occurring at the direction of a supervi-
sor or resulting from fear of loss of employment." MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(a) legal back-
ground of rule. See, e.g., In re Mogel, 18 A.D.2d 203, 238 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1963) (junior
partner's participation in arrangement initiated by senior partner, whereby the firm repre-
sented defendants in Gambler's Court pursuant to a retainer from defendants' employers
who conducted a policy operation, warranted disciplinary action); In re Knight, 281 A.2d
46 (Vt. 1971) (inexperienced attorney's participation in a scheme to obtain evidence of
adulterous acts by entrapment warranted a suspension from the practice of law even
though he acted under the domination of his employer and in fear of losing his
employment).
59. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(b).
"[T]he proposition stated in (b) [Rule 5.2(b)] has not been squarely presented to a
court." MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(b) legal background to rule.
60. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(b) comment 2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Mounts, supra note 6, at 532. In effect, this proposal would eliminate Model Rule
5.2(b) and replace it with the commentator's alternative rule.
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written, she noted that a staff attorney's deferral to a supervisor's
reasonable resolution of ethical questions could result in the attor-
ney resolving ethical dilemmas so as to avoid conflict with his su-
pervisors.' She noted that this is particularly true if the attorney
has no job protection.65 In such a situation, the fear of losing his
job would become a highly influential factor in the individual attor-
ney's decision whether to follow the superior's unreasonable
resolution.66
The commentator's proposal would require a supervisor to defer
to an individual staff attorney's reasonable resolution of an argua-
ble ethical question. 67 This alternative rule allows a supervisor to
override the individual attorney's ethical decision if it is unreasona-
ble.68 The author noted that this rule has the potential to cause
some disruption in the administration of defender programs.6 9 She
asserted, however, that such disruption is preferable to violations
of ethical rules.71 In addition, the author noted that this alterna-
tive rule would strengthen the individual attorney-client
relationship.71
The commentator contended that the courts and the legal pro-
fession should recognize the issue of relative responsibility and de-
64. Mounts reasons that:
The deputy defender is the attorney who most directly experiences the com-
promises in the quality of representation and is as a result more likely to feel the
ethical pressures created by the knowlege that one is violating the rules of pro-
fessional conduct. Thus to the extent that rules of professional conduct create
any loopholes in the deputy's ethical responsibility, any self-enforcing power of
those rules is undermined. The proposed Model Rules may create just such a
loophole in explicitly allowing the deputy to defer to the opinions of his supervi-
sors. Were the Rules to be enforced externally, then the deputy would still have
to make an assessment of whether the supervisor's opinion was "a reasonable
resolution of an arguable question of professional duty" in order to avoid possi-
ble professional discipline.
Id. at 531-32.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The proposed alternative rule states that "[t]he individual attorney has the pri-
mary responsibility for questions of professional responsibility and a supervising attorney
shall defer to the subordinate attorney if the subordinate's conduct is a reasonable resolu-
tion of an arguable question of professional duty." Id. at 532.
68. Id. at 532-33.
69. Id.
70. "But if the previous smooth-functioning of the [public defender] program was
based on substantial compromises in the quality of representation being provided and
concomitant violations of professional conduct, then the disruption is essential." Id.
71. Id. at 533. The proposed rule would strengthen the individual attorney-client
relationship by allowing the individual attorney to make ethical decisions affecting that
relationship, such as the decision whether or not to accept additional cases which could
interfere with the attorney's ability to adequately represent the existing client.
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vise a means of resolving ethical differences between attorneys in a
manner that allows organizations to function but also encourages
individual responsibility.72 She concluded that placing the profes-
sional obligation for ensuring competent representation on the in-
dividual attorney and supporting him in meeting that obligation
was the best means of ensuring competent representation in public
defender offices.73
Placing the Responsibility on the Legal Aid Organization
The NLADA Standards, which set forth goals for the operation
of legal aid organizations, state that organizations, as well as indi-
vidual attorneys, should provide high quality representation."4 It
is the organization, however, not the individual staff attorney,
which holds the ultimate responsibility for limiting caseload to en-
sure the quality of the organization's legal work." The standards
contain a case assignment and caseload limitation standard which
recomends that organizations providing legal services to the poor7 6
assign cases and limit individual caseloads according to certain
criteria.
These criteria include the status and complexity of an attorney's
existing caseload and his other work responsibilities.77 Moreover,
72. Id. at 530.
73. Id. at 533. The commentator's conclusion that the individual attorney should
bear the primary responsibility for resolving ethical questions is based, in part, on her
assertion that directors of defender programs are subject to political pressures which may
prevent them from setting program-wide standards. Id. at 508.
74. NLADA STANDARDS Introduction; see also Tull, The Development of Standards
for Legal Services: The Continuing Search for Quality, 38 NLADA BRIEFCASE 83
(1981). These standards for providers of legal services for the poor have been developed
by the NLADA beginning in 1969. During the ensuing years the NLADA has endeav-
ored to refine and improve these standards. The current draft of the standards has been
circulated among legal services providers and other interested persons for review and
comment. Id. at 83-84.
75. NLADA STANDARDS Introduction.
76. The NLADA Caseload Standards use the term "legal services provider" to in-
clude both staff attorney and other types of programs. Id.
77. The NLADA Standards state that:
A legal services provider should assign cases and limit individual caseloads ac-
cording to established criteria including the following:
1. the attorneys' or paralegals' specific level of experience, training, and
expertise,
2. the status and complexity of their existing caseload,
3. their other work responsibilities,
4. the provider's capacity to support and supervise the performance of the
attorney or paralegal, and
5. unique logistical problems facing the legal service provider or its clients
which directly affect the legal work.
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the comment to the caseload standard states that, in assigning
cases, the provider should take into consideration the time needed
for high quality work and the time the attorney has available."8
The comment concludes that organizations should limit caseloads
for offices and individual attorneys to ensure that both the organi-
zation and the attorney meet their ethical responsibilities.79
ANALYSIS
The Failure of the Individual Approach
The individual approach, placing the responsibility for limiting
caseload to avoid ethical violations on the individual staff attorney,
has certain advantages. The individual approach emphasizes the
importance of the individual lawyer's ethical responsibility, in
keeping with the provisions of the Model Code. ° This approach
also encourages the individual lawyer to exercise his professional
judgment for the benefit of his client, and not to further the inter-
ests of the legal aid organization, which may conflict with the cli-
ent's best interests.8 "
NLADA STANDARDS at 3.6.
78. NLADA STANDARDS comment at 3.6.
79. Id. at 3.6-3.7. The Comment to the NLADA Caseload Standard also contains
the following statement concerning the ethical implications of excessive caseloads:
Professional ethics recognize [sic] the need to ensure adequate time for prepara-
tion of a case and for acquiring sufficient knowledge and skill to handle every
accepted case with professional competence. (See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rules 1.1 and 1.3) Ethical Considerations suggest that advocates
have a further responsibility to reject cases unless they are certain they can
provide service at least at the minimal level of professional responsibility. Legal
Services advocates and offices are ethically required to limit the matters in
which they provide representation to avoid giving substandard assistance to
people they represent.
Id.
80. Regarding the individual lawyer's ethical responsibility, see MODEL CODE EC
5-1:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influ-
ences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients,
nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his
client.
81. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 324 (1970) regarding a legal aid organization's interests.
A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others
possesses a potential power to exert strong pressures against the independent
judgment of those lawyers. Some employers may be interested in furthering
their own economic, political or social goals without regard to the professional
responsibility of the lawyer to his individual client. Others may be far more
concerned with establishment or extension of legal principles than in the imme-
diate protection of the rights of the lawyer's individual client. On some occa-
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The individual approach is, however, potentially disruptive to
the smooth functioning of legal aid organizations.82 An attorney
without job protection faces the possibility of losing his position if
he protests his employer's caseload policy. Moreover, even an at-
torney with job protection may have difficulty in his relationships
with supervisors and colleagues if he complains about his excessive
caseload. A brief review of the history of the caseload problem in
the Legal Aid Society of New York illustrates that placing the re-
sponsibility on the individual attorney does not solve the problem.
In 1970, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed a wrongful discharge action brought by a public de-
fender who had been terminated after he complained to his super-
visors about his excessive workload.8 3  Three years later, the
Eastern District of New York set a numerical caseload limit for
Legal Aid Society attorneys, but the court's decision was reversed
on jurisdictional grounds.84 In 1981, another public defender in
New York was terminated after making complaints about exces-
sive workload.8 Shortly thereafter, the Legal Aid Society of New
York experienced a bitter strike in which caseload was a major
issue.86
Available statistics indicate that caseloads of legal aid attorneys
are already high and increasing. In 1973, the average criminal de-
fense lawyer in the Legal Aid Society handled thirty-seven cases at
one time.87 By 1983, the average caseload was fifty-three. 8  For
staff attorneys in government-funded legal service offices, a
sions, decisions on priority of work may be made by the employer rather than
the lawyer with the result that prosecution of work already undertaken for cli-
ents is postponed to their detriment.
Id. at 4-5.
82. A simple, unqualified conclusion that the deputy [individual public defender]
has professional obligations to his clients and thus has the ultimate control of
each of his cases would create serious problems. It would be impossible for the
Defender [supervising public defender] to run a program if one deputy decided
he could competently represent 200 cases per year, a second decided he could
represent only 100 cases per year and a third decided he could represent 400
cases per year. But the alternative of giving the Defender ultimate and com-
plete control is equally unworkable. As noted, this could mean that the director
of the Legal Aid Society of New York would have the ultimate say in nearly
200,000 cases per year.
Mounts, supra note 6, at 530.
83. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
87. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
88. Id.
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caseload of seventy-five is common. 9 Such heavy caseloads create
the potential for future strikes, discharges, and resignations.
Furthermore, statistics for the Solano County, California Public
Defender's Office indicate that excessive caseloads lead to in-
creased staff turnover, as well as highly publicized strikes and dis-
charges. 9° From 1969 to 1972, the office's pending caseload
averaged sixty cases per attorney. 91 During that period, the resig-
nation rate averaged 10% per year.92 From 1973 to 1976, the aver-
age caseload was 107 cases per attorney. 93 During this period, the
average resignation rate was 32.5%. 94 These statistics illustrate the
failure of the individual approach since they show an apparent cor-
relation between excessive caseloads and increased resignations.95
In addition, these statistics and the history of the caseload
problems in the New York Legal Aid Society show that a rule re-
quiring a supervisor to defer to a subordinate's reasonable resolu-
tion of an ethical question is unworkable. 96 If followed, this rule
would also cause disruption. Moreover, faced with the possibility
of discharge, attorneys may be unwilling to even present their reso-
89. Counsel to the Poor, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1980, at 89.
90. Ligda, supra note 8, at 6. The Other Face of Justice, a 1973 survey of public
defender offices by the NLADA, obtained the following statistics about the average
caseload in these offices:
Sixty-eight percent of the respondents to the same survey indicated that their
lawyers handled more than 100 felonies per attorney per year, with an average
of 173 per attorney. In the misdemeanor area, 45 percent of the reporting of-
fices handled over 400 misdemeanors per full-time attorney, with the average
being 483.
NLADA, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 29 (1973), quoted in R. WILSON, PUBLIC DE-
FENDER CASELOADS AND COMMON SENSE 6 (1974). This paper presents a caseweight-
ing system by which caseload, the number of cases a lawyer handles, can be translated
into workload, the amount of time it takes a lawyer to complete work on the caseload.
Id. at 14.
There are no more recent, nationwide statistics on the caseload problem and its effects.
9 1. "Our [the Solano County public defender's office] resignation rate increased from
10% to 32.5% between the 1969-72 four year period when our pending caseload aver-
aged 60 clients per attorney and the 1973-76 four-year period when our pending caseload
averaged 107 clients per attorney." Ligda, supra note 8, at 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. No external market factors seem to provide an explanation [of the increased
resignation rate]. When our resignation experience is compared to the overall
county rate, we find our increase contrasted to an overall decreasing rate.
When we look to the district attorney's experience, we find an increasing rate
compared with a steady rate on an even larger staff. Indeed, it is inescapable
that internal factors produced an environment which does not encourage attor-
neys to stay. They are getting tired. We have "burnout."
Id.
96. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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lution of the caseload question to their supervisors, preferring
either to ignore the problem or to resign. 97 Not only is the individ-
ual approach ineffective in solving the caseload problem, but ex-
isting ABA ethical opinions support the organizational approach.
ABA Ethical Opinions and the Legal Services Corporation Act
Support the Organizational Approach
In a formal opinion, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility stated that legal aid programs have
an ethical and moral obligation to determine broad policy mat-
ters. 98 These matters include client eligibility criteria, selection of
the types of services the program will offer, setting priorities in the
allocation of resources, and determining the types of cases attor-
neys may handle and the types of clients they may represent. 99
In another formal opinion, the committee stated that an indigent
person seeking assistance from a legal aid office has a lawyer-client
relationship with the entire staff of attorneys, not merely the indi-
vidual lawyer who handles the case.'00 The committee found the
relationship the same as that between a paying client and a law
firm.o10 The client retains the firm, not merely an individual attor-
ney. 0 2 Further, the committee stated that staff lawyers in a legal
aid office are subject to the direction of supervising attorneys, just
as associates in a law firm are subject to the control of senior
partners. 103
In an informal opinion, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility found that the refusal of directors of legal
aid organizations to set priorities for case acceptance was improper
if it caused inadequate preparation or neglect."° Moreover, the
committee stated that legal aid organizations could establish prior-
ity systems or other caseload limitation guidelines if these systems
or guidelines were fair and not inconsistent with the Model
97. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
98. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324, at 6
(1970).
99. Id.
100. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334, at 7
(1974); see also Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 445 F.2d 1150, 1152 (2d Cir. 1971) (client
is the client of the Legal Aid Society, not just of the individual attorney).
101. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334, at 7
(1974).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. "The refusal to set up priorities is improper if it causes a violation of DR 6-101."
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359, at 1 (1976).
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Code. 10 5 Thus, the opinion permits but does not require legal aid
organizations to set caseload limitations.0 6
In addition to these ABA opinions, the Legal Services Corpora-
tion Act requires the LSC to ensure that organizations founded by
the LSC maintain the highest quality professional standards. 10 7
These organizations' failure to set organizational caseload limita-
tion standards, if it results in ethical violations, thus arguably vio-
lates the Act. 1 8 Moreover, the legislative history of the Act
indicates that Congress recognized the caseload problem"° by rec-
ommending that organizations control their caseload by establish-
ing a priority system. 10
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ETHICAL RULES CONCERNING
CASELOAD IN LEGAL AID OFFICES
A Proposed Caseload Limitation Standard
In order to assist legal aid organizations in setting caseload lim-
its, the ABA should adopt a workload standard for providers of
civil legal assistance for the poor. The following proposed rule,
similar to the workload provision in the Defense Function section
of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 11 will set forth an eth-
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. "The Opinion [ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility For-
mal Op. 334 (1974)] indicates that the refusal to set restrictions [in case acceptance] is
entirely proper." Id. at 1.
107. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The courts have not interpreted this
section of the Act.
109. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
110. "Every [legal services] program has found it necessary to control its caseload,
and the most appropriate way of doing so is by establishing priorities as to the categories
or kinds of cases which the office will undertake." H.R. Rep. No. 310, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4503, 4512-13.
111. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, contain the follow-
ing workload provision:
Standard 5-4.3 Workload
Neither defender organization nor assigned counsel should accept workloads
that, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality
representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations. Whenever de-
fender organizations or assigned counsel determine, in the exercise of their best
professional judgment, that the acceptance of additional cases or continued rep-
resentation in previously accepted cases will lead to the furnishing of represen-
tation lacking in quality or to the breach of professional obligations, the
defender organization or assigned counsel must take such steps as may be ap-
propriate to reduce their pending or projected workloads.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 5-4.3.
The proposed workload standard for legal aid organizations, which is an adaptation of
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ical standard concerning caseload which will provide guidance for
legal aid organizations:
Legal aid organizations should not accept excessive workloads
which interfere with the rendering of high quality' 12 representa-
tion to their clients or result in violations of ethical standards.
Whenever such organizations determine, in the best exercise of
their professional judgment, that acceptance of additional cases
or continued representation in existing cases will result in inade-
quate representation or violations of ethical standards, the orga-
nizations must reduce their pending or projected workloads." 3
Under this standard, the legal aid organization should bear the
primary responsibility for limiting caseload. The NLADA
Caseload Standard or similar rules would provide additional gui-
dance to legal aid organizations in determining whether their
workload is excessive." 4 If the ABA adopts the proposed stan-
dard, organizations, particularly those governed by a board com-
posed of both lawyers and laypersons, would not be permitted to
apply the standard in ways which interfere with the individual staff
attorney's exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf
of the client." 5 The organization should set and enforce policy
guidelines. Individual attorneys should make decisions on a case-
by-case basis," 6 but if it appears that workload is excessive, the
Standard 5-4.3, could be included in a set of standards for legal aid organization similar
to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. See Tull, supra note 74, at 85.
112. Cf 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996, 2996f(a) (1) (the Legal Services Corporation is required
to ensure the maintenance of the "highest quality" professional standards).
113. See DR 6-101(A) (2), (3), DR 2-110(B) (2).
114. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS Standard 5-4.3 commentary at 5.48 n.4 and accompanying text.
115. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324, at 7
(1970); see also MODEL CODE EC 5-24 (a lawyer should not accept employment with a
legal aid organization administered by a board of lawyers and laymen, unless the board
sets only broad guidelines and does not interfere in the individual attorney-client relation-
ship); MODEL CODE DR 5-107(B) (a lawyer should not permit a person who employs
him to interfere with his professional judgment).
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324, at 7
(1970).
An organization could, for example, set a numerical limit of 50 cases per attorney.
This limit should not be applied rigidly. The attorney should make the decision to accept
new legal matters on a case-by-case basis, within that limit. An attorney who handles
complex litigation, such as class actions, or who has additional administrative duties,
should carry less than that limit. An attorney who handles routine matters which are
easily disposed of, however, could possibly handle more than 50 cases. An attorney's
caseload would be reviewed by his supervisor, using the 50-case limit as a guideline rather
than a strict rule. The attorney and his supervisor would meet periodically, for example,
once a month, to discuss the attorney's caseload and any resulting problems and possible
solutions. In addition, each attorney's caseload could be discussed with the other attor-
neys in the office at weekly case acceptance meetings. See supra note 36. Staff attorneys
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organization has the responsibility to make corrections. Further-
more, supervising attorneys should encourage staff attorneys to ex-
press their concerns regarding their workload." 7 Regular meetings
should be scheduled at which caseload problems can be discussed
and resolved."' If a caseload standard is adopted, standards for
assigning relative ethical responsibility between supervisor and
subordinate in legal aid organizations, similar to those contained in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, should also be
adopted. II9
A caseload limitation standard, coupled with standards for as-
signing relative ethical responsibility in legal aid organizations,
would provide guidance for courts and disciplinary commissions in
resolving ethical questions resulting from excessive caseloads. 2 °
Furthermore, such a standard would provide a basis for an individ-
ual attorney's workload complaints or grievances.' 2' In addition,
this standard, coupled with more specific guidelines suitable to a
given organization, could benefit resolution of workload disputes
between attorneys within the organization.'22 Finally, such stan-
dards would also prove useful to arbitrators in resolving labor dis-
putes over workload.'23
CONCLUSION
For decades, legal aid organizations of all types have exper-
ienced problems resulting from excessive caseloads.' 24 Commenta-
tors, courts, Congress, and the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility have recognized the caseload problems.
A caseload standard which places the primary responsibility for
limiting caseload to ensure compliance with ethical rules on the
legal aid organization is preferable to a standard which places the
primary responsibility on the individual attorney. The individual
could trade cases, offer suggestions concerning caseload to each other, and discuss and
hopefully resolve any difficulties. Further, the organization should have a grievance pro-
cedure for handling caseload problems which cannot be resolved at the individual office
level.
117. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Standard 5-4.3 commentary at 5.48.
118. See Williamson, supra note 36, at 1075-81.
119. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. at 846-47.
121. See Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 312 F. Supp. at 1105. The Lefcourt court did
not consider the plaintiffs ethical obligations as an attorney. His complaints may have
been motivated by ethical considerations. Mounts, supra note 6, at 527.
122. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Standard 5-4.3 commentary at 5.48.
123. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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approach has proven ineffective and ABA ethical opinions support
a shift to the organizational approach. Accordingly, the ABA
should adopt a workload standard for legal aid organizations simi-
lar to the standard for public defenders contained in the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice. Such a standard would provide
guidance for legal aid organizations, but the organizations should
apply this standard in a manner which does not interfere with the
independent professional judgment of the individual staff attorney.
In addition, a workload standard would provide guidance for
courts and disciplinary commissions in resolving ethical questions
related to excessive caseload.
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